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The conduct of monetary policy emphasises institutional arrangements which make monetary 
policy decision-making more ‘transparent’. Judged by these institutional features neither the 
Bundesbank, nor the ECB, score very highly. We test for (i) agents’ average ability to anticipate 
policy rate changes under the Bundesbank and the ECB and (ii) and agents’ forecasting unanimity 
of money market rates. Rising forecasting uncertainty may either be due to a lack of ECB 
transparency or to larger inflation and growth forecasting errors. Our results indicate that inflation 
forecast spreads widened amongst private agents and that inflation forecasting uncertainty increased 
the forecasting spread of money market rates.  
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Monetary Policy Transparency: 





Since the late 1980s there has been a marked convergence in the conduct of monetary policy in 
developed economies. Broadly speaking, this has consisted of three phases. Firstly, in the 1980s, 
emerged a consensus that the policy instrument should be a short-term rate of interest rather than 
any direct or quantititative controls on the growth of money and credit. Secondly, roughly the 
1990s, governments came to accept the arguments for credibility based upon the ‘conservative 
central banker’ and gave their central banks a considerable degree of independence in the conduct 
of monetary policy. More recently still, the argument that monetary policy outcomes are superior if 
policy-making is ‘transparent’ or ‘open’  has gained widespread support though, as we shall see, 
what makes for a ‘transparent’ policy process is not universally agreed. 
  Given the alleged benefits of transparency, it is natural that we should want to measure and 
rank policy-making regimes. Much of this work has followed the independence literature by listing 
a number of characteristics which a priori should make policy-making clear to observers and then 
checking these against the actual features of individual policy regimes. Judged in this way, neither 
the Bundesbank, nor its successor the ECB, score very highly and yet, interestingly, judged by 
outcomes, the Bundesbank’s conduct of monetary policy from 1948 to 1999 was the envy of all 
developed economies. 
  In this paper, in section 3, we take a different, and we think more direct and relevant, 
approach to measuring the degree of transparency in monetary policy making. On this test, the 
Bundesbank’s decisions appear to have been widely understood and expected. This is consistent 
with the general view of the Bundesbank as a successful central bank but undermines the argument 
that a specific set of institutional features are required as a pre-condition of transparency. 
Furthermore, we show that as far as German agents are concerned nothing has changed significantly 
with the introduction of the ECB, in spite of its alleged shortcomings in communicating its policy 
deliberations. This leads us to question whether the popular view that policy-making is more 
confused or obscure under the ECB may be based on circumstances which have nothing directly to 
do with transparency itself. 
  In section 4 we look at the possibility that agents have become more uncertain about 
monetary policy decisions in recent years. The logic of this is that although (in section 3) we see   3
that agents are well-able to anticipate interest rate decisions on average, this might conceal a 
widening dispersion of views about what the next move is likely to be. In the circumstances, agents 
will report themselves as ‘less certain’ (and blame the ECB).  We think that there is some evidence 
that agents have become more uncertain about monetary policy moves under the ECB. 
Another possibility is that there has been an increase in the general level of macroeconomic 
uncertainty during the period. If agents find it harder to predict the course of variables which enter 
into what they take to be the central bank’s decision rule, then this will show in a widening 
dispersion of views about future interest rates and an increase in the proportion of agents reporting 
that uncertainty. In section 5 we find that uncertainty about the future course of inflation does seem 
to have increased while evidence for the other key variable, GDP, is mixed. We also find that there 
is some evidence that inflation uncertainty increases agents’ uncertainty concerning money market 
rates. The implication is that it is not only the alleged opacity of ECB policy that has increased 
agents’ uncertainty, but short-term interest rate uncertainty is affected by uncertainty about future 
inflation.  
But the first step, in section 2, is to look (as briefly as we can) at why transparency is 
expected to produce superior monetary policy outcomes. (These arguments will justify our 
approach to measuring transparency in section 3). We shall also look at how the Bundesbank 
features in the existing transparency literature. 
 
2. Transparency and the Bundesbank 
 
One line of argument for the benefits of transparency, links it to credibility. In so far as being open 
about the inflation target and operating methods makes it easier for agents to hold the central bank 
to account, central banks have more incentive to deliver. With greater credibility, the sacrifice ratio 
is reduced. This is the basis of the paper by Chortareas et al., 2003. A second argument is that 
transparency reduces noise and the possibility for error in private sector decision making. Important 
here is that private sector agents understand the model of the economy with which the policy-
makers are operating.  This helps anchor the public’s expectations about future policy moves (Bean, 
1998 p.1796) and is the main argument behind the Bank of England’s ambition to make monetary 
policy ‘boring’ (King, 1997, p.440). If agents understand how the central bank’s mind works, then 
they can anticipate the next policy move, as though they were making policy for themselves. In 
these circumstances, the ‘news’ is in current economic developments and not in any subsequent 
interest rate change that the central bank might initiate in response. If this can be achieved, then 
monetary policy actions themselves no longer risk adding to the noise and general instability in the 
economy. A third argument follows from the breakdown of the policy ineffectiveness proposition.   4
This is that monetary policy actions do have an effect upon the real economy but that the 
transmission mechanism often involves medium or long-term interest rates, while the policy 
instrument is invariably a very short-term rate. What links the two is often said to be ‘expectations’ 
and from this it is argued that agents’ expectations are more likely to be correct if they fully 
understand the thinking behind the authorities’ actions. If all this is true, then policy transparency 
enhances the effectiveness of stabilisation policy. (Blinder et al., 2001; De Haan and Amtenbrink, 
2002; Woodford, 2001; Freedman, 2002). 
  Attempts to measure the degree of monetary policy transparency have taken three broad 
forms. The first, very reminiscent of the central bank independence literature (e.g. Alesina and 
Summers, 1993), might be called the ‘characteristics approach’ since it lists the characteristics 
which seem necessary a priori for transparency  (in all its dimensions) and then checks them against 
individual policy regimes. Such characteristics include: 
•  a fixed schedule of policy decision dates;  
•  the publication of the minutes of the meeting at which the decision is taken; 
•  publication of the voting record (where a committee is involved);  
•  a quantified inflation target;  
•  publication of the macroeconomic data underlying the decision;  
•  and an explanation of the macromodel used by the policy-makers.  
A second approach is to use survey evidence. Since money market traders have a powerful 
commercial incentive to anticipate central bank interest rate changes, it seems reasonable to assume 
that such agents will be particularly well-informed as to the principles guiding central bank 
decision-making and will hold strong views on how easy it is to understand those principles. 
  Thirdly, some studies have looked at the behaviour rather than the opinion of professional 
traders to see what this reveals about their ability to understand central bank thinking. Although 
there are many ways of doing the empirical tests, the central logic is to look at the extent to which 
market rates (determined by traders) anticipate the subsequent decision of central banks regarding 
the official rate. This is the ultimate and most direct test of the King ambition that the ‘news’ should 
be in the macroeconomic news and not in the central bank’s decision.  
It also addresses Daniel Thornton’s (2003) reservations about the tendency to pursue 
transparency as an end in itself. Thornton issues a number of cautions. Prime amongst these is the 
argument that economists should view transparency as beneficial only if it enhances monetary 
policy outcomes and the possibilities for this are dependent upon the objectives of policy. If, for 
example, stabilisation were a major objective of monetary policy, then secrecy and surprise would 
more likely be outcome-enhancing than transparency. Transparency can only be relevant if price   5
stability is the paramount objective. Even then, it is not clear that transparency is a necessary 
condition for success. ‘For years, the Swiss National Bank and the Bundesbank had credibility for 
keeping inflation low and steady. This occurred despite the fact that neither central bank was a 
model of transparency’. (Thornton, 2003, 485). If the principal objective of policy is price stability, 
then the ability of agents to understand and anticipate central bank decisions is one aspect of 
transparency that should be helpful. 
  Table 1 shows the rankings of a range of central banks as determined by a variety of the 
‘characteristics’ studies and by two surveys. 
 
Table 1: Central bank transparency - rankings by study 















De Haan*  
(2004) 
Australia 15=  7= -  -  -  - 
Canada 13=  4  3 - - - 
D Bundesbank  25=  -  6  5  2  5 
Eurozone -  5=  4  2 4 6 
France 40=  -  - -  -  4 
Italy 12  -  -  -  -  1 
Japan 5  7=  -  -  -  3 
New Zealand  4 1  1  4  -  - 
Sweden 1=  3  - - - - 
Switzerland 8=  9  -  -  -  - 
UK 3  2  2  1  3  2 
US 1=  5=  5  3  1  7 
Sources: see text. Note: * = survey of market opinion 
 
  Some caution is needed in interpreting the results since the studies vary considerably in size 
and range. But it is apparent that, within each study in which it appears, the Bundesbank comes low 
in the rankings (except for the Goldman Sachs survey) and the ECB (‘Eurozone’) comes low in the 
rankings (except for the survey by Gros and Bini-Smaghi). The low ranking of the ECB is echoed, 
of course, in the debate between Buiter (1999) and Issing (1999) where the former laments the ECB 
decision not to publish minutes or voting records of meetings, or an inflation report. 
  As we said above, the third approach, focusing upon the behaviour of short-term market 
interest rates, offers a more direct test of transparency particularly if we see transparency as   6
meaning the ability of agents to anticipate central bank decisions. Examples of this approach 
include Kuttner (2001) and Poole, Rasche and Thornton (2002) who have all documented the ability 
of US money markets to anticipate monetary policy change., the latter showing that anticipation has 
improved since the Federal Reserve began announcing its target for the Federal Funds rate in 1994.  
  The remarkable feature of those studies which shed light on anticipation in the case of the 
Bundesbank and the ECB, however, bearing in mind variations in data, time periods and 
methodologies, is the extent of their agreement that agents understand the Bundesbank/ECB 
decision-making process at least as well as they do in regimes noted (in the other evidence) for their 
transparency. Typical is the paper by Perez-Quiros and Sicilia (2002) which makes explicit 
comparison between the ECB and the Federal Reserve and finds ‘…that markets do not fully 
predict the ECB decisions but the lack of perfect predictability is comparable with the results found 
for the United States Federal Reserve.’ (2002, p.4).  In their study of Norway’s central bank, 
Bernhardsen and Kloster (2002) found that market anticipation of policy was inferior to that of the 
Eurozone, but that the latter was higher than in the UK and USA. Coppell and Connolly (2003), 
looked at market anticipation in Australia using a methodology similar to that of Haldane and Read, 
2000 (see below) and compared it with other regimes including the USA, UK, Canada and 
Germany. The data covered the period 1996 to 2002 and thus for Germany covered a period of both 
Bundesbank and ECB policy-making. They found ‘…it [was] not possible to reject the hypothesis 
that the level of anticipation by the markets of a rate move in each country [was] equal’. Daniel 
Hardy’s (1998) study for the IMF rather pre-dates the interest in transparency and is a rather oblique 
test of anticipation. It focused directly on the Bundesbank, without comparisons, but nonetheless 
shows evidence of German money markets having little difficulty in anticipating Bundesbank 
interest rate decisions. Ross (2002) is another IMF study, this time of the ECB after three years of 
operation. This too makes comparisons with the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England and 
concludes ‘That all three central banks are relatively predictable institutions with a high degree of 
credibility’. The study did though find that markets have had some difficulty in anticipating large 
changes and especially cuts in ECB rates. 
  The study by Haldane and Read (2000) is particularly interesting partly because it 
decomposes monetary ‘surprises’ into news about policy variables and news about policy 
preferences but also because its approach has been taken up by other researchers like Coppell and 
Connolly (above) and is used in the empirical section of this paper. Its immediate relevance here is 
that it compared the response to surprises of the yield curve in the UK, USA, Italy and Germany. 
News about policy variables shows up in movements at the short end of the yield curve and is 
evidence of imperfect transparency. The sample period is March 1984 to January 1997 (so for 
Germany it covers only the Bundesbank regime). The results are worth quoting at some length.   7
 
Looking first at surprises at the short end … these are significantly larger in the UK and 
Italy than in the United States and Germany. For example, in Italy the percentage surprise is 
between 40-80% at the short end, while in the UK it is between 30-60%. This compares with 
between 5-15% in the United States and Germany, pointing towards a much better defined 
reaction function in the latter two countries. This seems intuitively plausible. (Haldane and 
Read, 2000 p.29. Our emphasis). 
 
In a three-way comparative study of the degree of anticipation and speed of adjustment of 
market rates to official rates using a GARCH model, we ourselves found that agents seemed best 
able to anticipate the decisions of the Bank of England, though the Bundesbank’s also contained 
little surprise. (Biefang and Howells, 2004a). Agents had more problems with the ECB. In 
particular, like Ross (2002) we found that they were often surprised by cuts in the ECB rate, a fact 
we attributed to the ECB being a relatively new institution and to very few instances of interest rate 
reductions from which markets could learn. (See also Financial Times, 11.5.01). 
So, there is something strange here.  On the basis of visible operating procedures, the 
Bundesbank and the ECB score relatively low on the transparency index. And yet the Bundesbank 
by reputation was the model of a successful central bank. Furthermore, tests of agents’ ability to 
understand and anticipate central bank policy actions (the test that matters) both perform relatively 
well. In the rest of this paper we go on to consider whether there may be other factors at work, 
giving the Bundesbank and the ECB an unwarranted reputation for opacity, when in reality agents 
have little difficulty in following the signals. The first step, in the next section, is to update agents’ 
responses to Bundesbank/ECB decisions to check firstly the degree of anticipation and to see 
whether this anticipation changes when policy is taken over by the ECB. 
 
3. Policy anticipation  
Agents do not have perfect knowledge of future central bank actions. There is uncertainty about the 
path of future macro variables and, in the absence of a published Taylor-rule or similar, uncertainty 
about the central bank’s reaction function. Thus the conventional view is that depending on the 
degree of central bank transparency, some amount of surprise will remain, which will cause a jump 
in the yield curve on the day of announcement. The size of the jump may be a measure of central 
bank opacity. 
We use daily data for Germany from January 1989 until 21
st July 2004. The market interest 
rates are the daily rates in Frankfurt for 1, 3, 6, and 12 months. This gave us about 3890 
observations on each maturity. During this period, the Bundesbank changed the discount rate 22   8
times over 10 years and the ECB changed its policy rate in the last five and a half years 15 times. 
The median of the policy rate changes by the Bundesbank is 50 basis points, while the ECB median 
is 25 basis points. The Bundesbank only had one sign change, while the policy rate of the ECB 
changed sign twice.  
In this section, we are interested in two questions, namely (i) what is the size of the average 
policy rate surprise over the whole sample period and (ii), has policy surprise altered since the ECB 
took over the conduct of monetary policy from the Bundesbank. To extract some measure of policy 
surprise and its potential change along the yield curve, we estimate the change in the market interest 
rate as follows (Haldane and Read, 2000): 
 
( ) ,, () 9 9 1 tj j j tj j t j t t mar c L mar pol D pol e βλ δ ∆= +∆+ ∆ + ∆ + 
 
The subscript j stands for the term to maturity. The variable mar indicates the market rate, pol 
stands for the official rate and D99 is an impulse dummy with the value 1 from January 1999 
onwards and zero otherwise.    
Lags of the dependent variable were included to reduce serial correlation. The coefficient λ 
measures the average interest rate surprise over the full sample. If λ=0, the market rate does not 
change in response to the change in the official rate and policy was fully anticipated before the 
central bank changed the official rate. In other words, central bank policy itself is no news. Since 
the central bank is expected to change the policy rate in response to the change in the macro 
economic variables, market rates adjust in response to macroeconomic news, only and before the 
central bank changes the policy rate. Similarly, if λ=1, market agents are completely taken by 
surprise by central bank policy with all adjustment taking place on the day of announcement. 
The coefficient δ measures the effect on mean interest rate surprises due to the regime shift 
from Bundesbank to ECB. If δ=0, then there is no change in interest rate surprises due to the regime 
shift. If, as the financial press has suggested on various occasions, changes in the ECB policy rate 
are unexpected, then the sign of the coefficient δ should be positive. The sum of the coefficients λ 
and δ measures the size of the average interest rate surprise along the yield curve during the later 
period of ECB policy.  
Table 1 below shows the results of equation (1). The model was estimated with OLS. Since 
all equations have significant levels of serial correlation, the t-values in brackets in Table 1 are 
calculated on the basis of Newey-West adjusted standard errors to ensure consistency.
1 
 
                                                 
1 The results of the Lagrange Multiplier test are not reported here, but will be provided by the authors on request.   9
Table 1: The policy surprise in short-term interest rates in Germany 
j Rate   c  ,1 j β   ,2 j β   ,3 j β   j λ   j δ  
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Turning first to 
2 R , we note that between 5 and 10 per cent of the average variation in the market 
rate is explained by the model. The policy surprise coefficient λ is significant throughout the yield 
curve. Taking the sample period as a whole, between about 9 and 6 per cent of a policy rate change 
comes as a surprise on the day of the announcement. These results indicate that the information 
advantage of the central bank on macroeconomic development over private agents is quite low.
2 
The coefficient of the dummy variable is positive, although insignificant along the yield curve. 
Crucially, we do not find statistical evidence for the hypothesis that ECB interest rate decisions 
contain a greater surprise element than the former Bundesbank’s. 
 
4. Interest rate uncertainty 
In the previous section we found that on average, agents’ ability to anticipate central bank monetary 
policy has not changed since the regime shift and, that on average, anticipation is actually quite high 
during both regimes. In this section, we look at central bank policy anticipation from a different 
angle. We now look at the degree of unanimity with which private agents anticipate interest rate 
changes by the central bank. In other words, we test whether the cross-sectional distribution of 
forecasting has changed. It may very well be that anticipation and implicitly policy forecasting has 
not changed on average; however, the forecast spread of private forecasters may have altered. This 
effect would not show up in the estimations of the previous section.  
If the distribution of cross-sectional dispersion has shifted since the ECB conducts monetary 
policy, in that the range of forecasts has become wider, then this fall in private agents’ unanimity 
indicates that private agents have become more uncertain about the conduct of monetary policy.  
                                                 
2 This compares with similar coefficients for the Bank of England since the introduction of inflation targeting (Biefang-
Frisancho Mariscal  and Howells, 2004b)   10
Next, we turn to the measurement of consensus across agents’ forecasts and then we test whether 
there has been a change in it.  
   For measurement purposes, we looked at the range of forecasts of private institutions as 
reported in Consensus Forecasts. Every month, this publication shows the forecasts for, inter alia, 
the 3-month euro-DM interest rate for some 25 private sector institutions (although this number of 
institutions reporting forecasts varies somewhat during the year). The forecasts are for 3 and 12 
months ahead. We calculated the range for the third highest and third lowest forecasts (which is 
about the 12
th and 88
th percentile of the distribution) and compared it over time. Any changes in the 
cross-sectional distribution of forecasts are interpreted as a change in the conformity with which 
individual private agents forecast central bank policy. The figure below shows the annual 
(AnnualRange) and quarterly (Range) forecast range of the 3-month Euro-DM rate. 
 
Figure 1: Range of quarterly and annual forecasts of 3-month euro-DM rates  





































































































































The quarterly forecast range varies most of the time between 0.2 and 0.6 percentage points.  
Between the two periods, 1994 and 1995 and 2001 and the beginning of 2002, the range is wider 
and falls thereafter. In 2000/01, the ECB was a new institution, which may be reflected in the 
initially widening and then declining forecasting spread of the money market rate. From the 3
rd 
quarter 2002 onwards, the quarterly forecast range falls to and below its previous conventional 
level. The one-year ahead forecast range has a more varied pattern. The forecast range peaked for 
the beginning of 1996 to 1.4 percentage points indicating that agents’ forecast uncertainty 
concerning interest rate predictions for 1996 was high. Agents’ uncertainty fell steeply from then   11
onwards to about 0.6 percentage points between mid 1998 and end 2000. This degree of consensus 
fell from 2001 onwards, where a positive trend seems to show up. 
  In order to test whether there was a significant change over time in agents’ degree of 
uncertainty and whether uncertainty changed significantly since the introduction of ECB policy, we 
estimated the following model: 
 
, 99 99 (2) ti i i i i t Range D Trend D Trend e α γβ δ =+ + + +  
 
The subscript i distinguishes between the quarterly and one-year ahead forecast range of the euro-
DM rate. The dummy variable D99 has the value 1 from January 1999 onwards and is zero 
otherwise. The variable Trend is a time trend. The coefficient γ measures the shift in the degree of 
uncertainty since 1999. If γ=0, then the level of uncertainty has not changed since the regime 
change to ECB monetary policy. A positive coefficient γ indicates an increase in the forecasting 
range of private agents. The coefficient β measures the development of agents’ uncertainty over 
time over the entire sample period. A negative β-coefficient indicates increasing forecasting 
consensus of the private institutions reported in Consensus Forecasts.  The coefficient δ measures 
the change in degree of uncertainty over time since the institutional change. The sum of the 
coefficients β and δ measures the degree of agents’ uncertainty over time during ECB policy. The 
table below shows the empirical results: 
Table 2: Quarterly and annual forecasting range of the 3-month euro-DM rates 
Variable  i α   i γ   i β   i δ  



















Note: All equations are estimated by OLS and the t-values in brackets are calculated on the basis of Newy-
West adjusted variances and covariances.  
 
Firstly, we turn to the results of the estimation of the quarterly forecast range (Range). We 
find that 12% of the variation of the mean forecast range is explained by the model. Over the whole 
sample period, mean forecasting uncertainty declines by 0.004 percentage points per month. Since 
the ECB has taken over monetary policy, the downward trend in forecasting uncertainty has been 
reversed. For the later period alone, there is no (upward or downward) trend in the average 
forecasting range. The shift dummy is insignificant, so that for the ECB period, the average   12
forecasting range (the difference between the third highest and third lowest euro-DM interest rate 
forecast)  is not different from the overall sample range of 0.49 percentage points.  
The 
2 R in the second equation of Table 2 shows that 45% of the average variation in the 
one-year-ahead forecast range of the 3-month euro-DM rate is explained by the model. All 
coefficients are significant. Over the sample period, the average forecasting range declines by 0.012 
percentage points per year. This trend has been reversed since ECB policy was introduced. During 
the ECB regime, monetary uncertainty has been rising on average over time by 0.005 percentage 
points. As can already be seen in figure 1, the average forecasting range was high during the 
Bundesbank regime and declined thereafter. The average forecasting range has fallen significantly 
since ECB’s monetary policy regime. During the later sample period, the average forecasting range 
is about 0.3 percentage points, which compares with about 1.2 percentage points during the 
Bundesbank regime.  
These results suggest that uncertainty regarding the 3-month euro-DM rate has risen since 
the ECB conducts monetary policy. However, the result is not so unambiguous for the one-year 
ahead forecasting range of the euro-DM interest rate. There we found that the downward trend has 
reversed to an upward trend in uncertainty since ECB policy, but also, that there has been a strong 
downward shift in the average forecasting range. Considering the results of the one-year ahead 
forecasting range, we cannot generalise that ECB policy has increased agents’ uncertainty. Also, it 
may not be ECB’s ad-hoc policy or lack of transparency which is responsible for the reported 
increase in uncertainty. We turn to this issue in the section below. 
 
5. Macroeconomic uncertainty 
In this section, we are concerned with the question for why agents have become more uncertain 
about forecasting the money market rate. The underlying hypothesis is, of course, that this is due to 
the way in which the ECB conducts monetary policy relative to the former Bundesbank. However, 
since agents are assumed to ‘guess’ on the basis of a ‘policy rule’ which itself relates the official 
rate to macroeconomic indicators,  uncertainty does not only arise about the coefficients in this 
relationship, but also about the terms relating to the coefficients. In other words, even if the central 
bank reaction function is well understood and known, it is possible that agents find it difficult to 
forecast relevant macroeconomic variables. If this is the case, then even for given and ‘known’ 
coefficients in the reaction function, the forecasting range of money market rates varies with the 
forecasting range of, let us say, the inflation rate. The uncertainty about future inflation (or 
economic growth), will then show up in a greater spread of the forecasts of money market rates.  
Agents may become more uncertain about macroeconomic development, either because the 
economy moves away from a more stable state, or there is a turn in the business cycle, or the   13
economy experiences shocks, to give just a few examples. Also the establishment of new, major 
institutions may initially cause greater uncertainty for agents until these institutions have been 
established for some years or so.  
EMU is a new phenomenon and in this section we want to analyse whether agents found it 
more difficult in these circumstances to predict macroeconomic variables as inflation and GDP 
growth.  Particularly at the beginning of the EMU, it may be more difficult for agents to predict the 
macroeconomy of individual countries in the ‘new’ area given the uncertainty over the true degree 
of convergence of individual economies and how they would react to the ‘one-size-fits-all’ level of 
interest rates. Since the prediction of central bank policy moves depends to some extent on agents 
being able to forecast movements in the variables entering the bank’s reaction function, then 
increasing difficulty in forecasting these variables would make agents less confident in their 
anticipation of policy moves.  
The official interest rate is set by the central bank according to a monetary policy rule that 
describes how interest rate decisions link to the state of the economy, as inflation, output, 
employment etc. Given this rule, agents will tend to form their guesses about future policy rates not 
only on their knowledge and understanding of the central bank policy rule, but also on their ability 
to predict the terms in the policy rule, as inflation, output etc. If forecasting uncertainty of relevant 
macroeconomic variables has changed, this change must, via the central bank policy rule, affect 
agents’ degree of monetary policy uncertainty. 
 Firstly, we will look at how agents’ uncertainty regarding inflation and GDP growth in 
Germany has developed over time. Secondly, we will test whether macroeconomic forecasting 
uncertainty has affected interest rate uncertainty.  
  We turn to the analysis of agents’ degree of uncertainty with respect to inflation and real 
GDP growth. As before, we use the forecasting range, calculated as the difference between the 
fourth highest and fourth lowest forecasting value. We have monthly data for inflation and real 
GDP growth, each predicted one year ahead. The sample period for the inflation forecast range is 
from January 1995 until May 2005 and for the GDP growth range it is from June 1995 until May 
2005. Forecasts for GDP growth refer to unified Germany throughout. Inflation forecasts are 
reported for West Germany until September 1997, only. Figures 2 and 3 below show the one-year-
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Figure 2: The one-year-ahead inflation forecast range 

































































































































 Note: calculated as the difference between the third upper and third lower forecast 
 
Figure 2 shows that the forecasting range of the inflation rate varies between 0.4 and 0.8 percentage 
points until the end of 2000. After that period, an upward trend is discernible, with a generally 
higher level of the forecasting range.  
Turning to Figure 3, uncertainty concerning forecasts of GDP growth is higher than inflation 
uncertainty. This is particularly so until mid 1998. From then onwards, there is a fall in the level of 
the forecasting range and later in the sample period, a slight upward trend. 
Figure 3: The one-year-ahead real GDP growth forecast range 


































































































































 Note: calculated as the difference between the fourth upper and fourth lower forecast.   15
 
 The estimation results depicted in Table 3, confirm these observations. We used equation (2) 
above, where now the dependent variables changed to the one-year-ahead inflation and one-year-
ahead real GDP growth forecasting range. Also, the dummy has now the value 1 from 2000 
onwards and zero otherwise.
3 We included a further dummy to account for a change in the reporting 
of the inflation data from West Germany to Germany. It was insignificant and not reported here. 
 
Table 3: Annual forecasting range of the inflation rate and GDP growth.   
Variable  i α   i γ   i β   i δ  



















Note: All equations are estimated by OLS and the t-values in brackets are calculated on the basis of Newy-
West adjusted variances and covariances.  
 
We firstly turn to the discussion of the inflation range. Over the entire sample period, the average 
inflation forecasting range was about 0.55 percentage points in Germany. Since the ECB regime, 
there is no change in the mean level of the forecasting range. However, we notice that while over 
the entire sample period there is no discernible trend in the mean forecasting range, the later period 
shows that average inflation uncertainty has steadily risen by 0.005 percentage points per month. 
The estimation results for GDP uncertainty confirm those of Figure 3. The average forecasting 
range for real GDP growth was rather high at the beginning of the sample period and fell 
dramatically since 2000. While there is no trend behaviour over the entire sample period, we find, 
as for the inflation range, that uncertainty is rising steadily since the ECB regime.   
While the change in GDP uncertainty is not unambiguous from 2000 onwards, inflation 
uncertainty obviously has risen in the more recent period. As we discussed above, this rise in 
inflation uncertainty may account for some of the increase in money market rate uncertainty. In the 
following section, we want to test whether this is actually the case.  
We modified equation (2) above and only added the one-year-ahead inflation range. We 
only estimated equation (2) for the one-year-ahead forecast range of the euro-DM rate since we do 
not have inflation data that are forecast monthly or three-month-ahead. The estimation result is: 
 
                                                 
3 Agents forecast GDP growth and inflation in 1998 for 1999, in 1999 for 2000 etc. In 1998, when the forecast was 
made for 1999, the ECB was not yet established.   16
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The variables and diagnostics are defined as before, with AInflRange as the one-year-ahead inflation 
range. The values in brackets are t-statistics. We used OLS and the variances and covariances are 
Newey-West adjusted. The coefficients have not changed very much from those for the annual 
euor-DM interest rates as reported in Table 2. Inflation uncertainty increases the mean forecasting 
range of the euro-DM rates by 0.25 percentage points. However, this coefficient is only significant 




We addressed the question of Bundesbank and ECB policy anticipation from two angles. Firstly, we 
estimated the average size of policy surprise during the Bundesbank and the ECB regime, 
respectively. We found that during both regimes, money markets anticipated policy changes well. In 
comparison to other studies and our own, we found that the mean degree of anticipation for 
Bundesbank and ECB was as good as for the BoE during its inflation targeting period (see also 
Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal and Howells, 2004b). Further, there was no break in the coefficients 
when the regime changed from Bundesbank to ECB. This part of the anticipation analysis has been 
concerned with the average degree of anticipation and implies that on average, agents forecasted 
movements in the official rate, well.  
Secondly, still concerned with the question of policy anticipation, we turn our attention to 
the cross-sectional spread of private sector policy anticipation. It is possible, that mean anticipation 
has not changed during the two regimes, but that there has been a widening of the cross-sectional 
dispersion in policy anticipation. We interpret the widening of this spread as an increase in agents’ 
uncertainty about the conduct of central bank policy. We measure the degree of cross sectional 
dispersion by calculating the difference between the third highest (about 90
th percentile) and the 
third lowest (about 10
th percentile) private agent forecast for the euro-DM money market rates.  
When we test formally, we find clear indication that the 3-month ahead forecasting dispersion for 
the 3-month euro-DM rate has risen since the ECB conducts monetary policy. Is this rise solely due 
to ECB’s opaque policy, or do other factors play a role?  
In answer to this question, we find that private agents have become more uncertain about 
forecasting inflation. Inflation uncertainty has grown gradually since ECB conducts monetary 
policy. The result on GDP growth uncertainty is more ambiguous.   17
In the last section of the empirical analysis, we test whether the rise in private agents’ 
inflation forecasting uncertainty has affected the dispersion of money market rates. We find some 
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